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Abstract: This paper aims to investigate companies’ environmental, social, governance 
(ESG), and financial implications of their commitment to the United Nations Global 
Compact (UNGC). The focus is placed on companies operating in the three countries with 
the highest number of UNGC participants: Spain, France, and Japan. The results clearly 
reveal that adoption of the UNGC often requires an organizational change that fosters 
stakeholder engagement, ultimately resulting in improvements in companies’ ESG 
performance. Additionally, the results reveal that ESG performance has a significant 
impact on financial performance for companies that adopted the principles of the UNGC. 
These findings provide both non-financial and financial incentives to companies to commit 
to this voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiative, which will have important 
implications on companies’ strategic management policies that aim to foster sustainable 
businesses and community development. Finally, the linkages between the UNGC-committed 
companies’ ESG and financial performance may be influenced by geographical spread, 
mainly due to the appearance of differences in the institutional, societal, and cultural settings.  
Keywords: United Nations Global Compact; environmental performance; social 
performance; stakeholders; sustainable development; stakeholder theory 
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1. Introduction 
During the last 20 years, several corporate social responsibility (CSR) voluntary initiatives have 
emerged asking corporations to adhere to a predefined set of norms and values [1]. Examples of these 
initiatives are the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) [2], Social Accountability 8000 [3], and the ISO 
14000 [4]. Among this catalog of voluntary CSR initiatives, the United Nations Global Compact 
(hereafter, the UNGC) is one of the most prominent and widespread CSR initiatives implemented by 
companies around the world [5,6]. As of December 2014, more than 12,700 business and non-business 
participants are part of the initiative. The underlying idea of the UNGC is that business participants 
advance broader UN objectives as well as 10 specific principles in the following four areas: (1) human 
rights, (2) labor rights, (3) the environment, and (4) anticorruption [1]. The UNGC is designed to be an 
expression of obligations and responsibilities taken by organizations implemented in response to 
external institutional pressures and constraints. The main advantage of the UNGC—like that of other 
CSR initiatives—is that it has the ability to promote social responsibility by serving as a guide toward 
greater transparency and accountability [7]. Moreover, the UNGC encouraged the dialogue between 
several social actors who had never previously engaged in discussion [7]. Another interesting feature 
of the UNGC is the social network resulting from interaction among participants [8]. Due to the 
growing relevance of such voluntary CSR initiatives, a large amount academic research has focused on 
analyzing the historical and political context of the UNGC [9,10], discussing the role of the UNGC in 
global governance [10], identifying the underlying organizations’ motivations to adopt the UNGC [11], 
and identifying the specific financial and non-financial profiles of the UNGC participants. 
Despite the rapid growth in the number of academic works in this field [12], the corporate ESG and 
financial implications of the implementation of the UNGC remain under-investigated [1,13,14]. To 
address this issue, this work aims to investigate whether the firms’ commitment to the UNGC has an 
influence on companies’ ESG and financial performances. To this end, the ESG performance of 
companies in the three countries with the highest rate of UNGC adoption—Japan, France, and Spain—is 
examined. One distinct feature of this paper is companies’ ESG performance being assessed into three 
“dimensions” [15]: corporate social (CSP), environmental (CEP), and governance performance (CSP). 
Based on that sample, this work also contributes to previous literature by investigating the  
possible appearance of bidirectional linkages between companies’ ESG performance and financial  
performance (CFP). Finally, we test for a country’s moderating effect in order to capture whether the 
geographical context in which the companies develop their businesses significantly modifies the 
aforementioned relationships. All of these analyses will reveal fresh and interesting insights that have 
been scarcely analyzed in previous research in the field. In fact, the results clearly reveal that 
companies’ commitment to the UNGC has a positive impact on ESG performance. This finding is of 
special importance for companies’ strategic management, as it provides non-financial incentives to 
adopt the UNGC, thus enhancing environmental preservation, human well-being, social justice, and 
sustainable community development. Moreover, several positive bidirectional links exist between ESG 
performance and CFP in companies that adopted the UNGC. This finding is also interesting because, in 
the absence of non-financial incentives to adopt the UNGC, the financial incentives can encourage 
UNGC adoption, which will ultimately result in collaborative solutions to broadly accepted societal 
and environmental objectives. Finally, some positive moderating effects appear in the companies’ ESG 
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and financial performance linkages, clearly indicating that the geographical spread of businesses  
play a significant role in the aforementioned relationships, an issue that has not been addressed by 
previous research.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: The second section provides a brief introduction to 
the objectives, main features of the UNGC; reviews the previous research in the field; and motivates 
the research hypotheses. The third section describes the sample and the measures of firms’ ESG and 
financial performances and introduces the main econometric models applied in the empirical section. 
Section 4 discusses the main results of the research. Finally, the conclusions and implications of the 
research are provided in the last section. 
2. Global Compact Features, Literature Review, and Hypotheses 
2.1. The UNGC and Its Impact on Companies’ ESG Performance 
The UNGC, first presented at the 1999 World Economic Forum in Davos by Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan and launched in July 2000, is an extensive network that encompasses different 
participants, such as companies, trade unions, social organizations—foundations and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs)—and governments. As of December 2014, the UNGC had more than  
12,700 signatories. Articulated around 10 principles relating to human rights, labor rights, the 
environment and anticorruption, the UNGC requires support, collaboration, and commitment to 
implement these principles in each of the areas that a company can influence. The 10 principles were 
selected according to their relevance to international rule-making, their importance in advancing social 
and environmental issues, and the extent to which they had inter-governmental support [16]. 
Specifically, they were derived from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, and 
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. The UNGC is conceived as a learning network 
rather than a compliance-based standard or model [17], which focuses on “the dissemination of practical 
know-how and tools on CSR” [18]. 
The growing relevance both at the institutional and organizational levels of the UNGC has attained 
the interest of academics, resulting in an emerging body of research that can be classified into three 
different perspectives: (1) research discussing the UNGC in the context of UN-business relations;  
(2) research discussing the UNGC in the context of the changing dynamics of multi-actor and  
multi-level global governance; and (3) research on the operational dimension of the UNGC [1]. 
The works classified under the first research perspective have mainly focused on investigating the 
historical and political context of the UNGC [9,10]. These works generally concluded that the UNGC 
has shifted the relationship between the UN and the private sector in two interrelated ways: First, the 
UNGC shifted the UN’s traditional perspective of focusing on the impacts of transnational companies 
from a belief in solutions focused on interstate negotiations toward a more widespread and voluntary 
multi-actor model that incorporates companies as well as state actors. Second, the adoption of a more 
inclusive model also modified the very nature of UN-business relationships from a largely reactive to a 
more proactive attitude [1]. 
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The works classified under the second perspective (i.e., governance perspective) follow a  
macro-level approach discussing the UNGC’s role in global governance. Specifically, works in this 
perspective conceive the UNGC as an expression of a novel global public domain [10], thus noting 
some opportunities and constraints that influence the way the global governance is implemented. The 
works that have adopted this perspective have mostly focused on the institutional design of the UNGC 
and how it contributes to implementing governance in the new public domain. For example,  
Ruggie [19] indicates that the multi-actor design of the UNGC and its emphasis on dialogue and 
learning can enhance the legitimacy of governance solutions. Conversely, Soederberg [20] criticizes 
the design of the UNGC and argues that the UNGC does not empower civil society actors and thus 
remains exclusionary. 
The works classified under the third perspective focus on three key areas: (1) the firms’ motivations 
to adopt the UNGC; (2) the composition of the UNGC participants; and (3) the impact of committed 
firms’ operations and business strategies. Regarding the latter, several works have focused on  
analyzing the financial and non-financial benefits of the UNGC adoption, such as improvements in 
corporate image, the option of making the organization stand out from the competition, learning  
better practices, obtaining competitive advantages, and facilitating strategic changes when implementing 
the principles [11]. However, these studies paint a mixed picture of the UNGC’s impact on business 
practices [21] mainly due to the following reasons: (1) the different stages of business performance of 
the participating firms [22] and (2) the heterogeneous nature of participating firms’ size, geographical 
spread, and industry sector. Moreover, only a few studies—under this third perspective—have 
investigated whether the firms’ commitment to the UNGC impacts their CEP, CSP, and CGP levels. 
However, the UNGC 2012 survey supports the idea that the majority of committed companies are 
putting policies in place, as well as related actions to preserve the environment and to improve labor 
standards at the highest rates though anticorruption efforts [23]. 
The above-mentioned literature mainly provided a practitioner-oriented overview of attitudes 
toward sustainability under the scope of the UNGC. As a result, little is known about the ESG 
implications of the adoption of the UNGC. To address this issue, this paper aims to test whether the 
commitment to the UNGC influences companies’ ESG performance, an issue that, to the best of the 
authors’ knowledge, remains unclear. We focus on three countries (i.e., Spain, France, and Japan) with 
contrasted differences in their cultural and institutional settings. Furthermore, according to data 
published by the United Nations Global Compact Office (UNGCO), Spain, France, and Japan are the 
countries with the highest rate of participating organizations. Spain has led the field since 2009 and 
represents 14% of the total, while France represents 8% and Japan 2%. Thus, this analysis acquires 
more representativeness. Based on this selection, the results will not be biased because, such as 
indicated by Harms et al. [24], it could be expected that the degree of implementation of the  
10 principles of the UNGC varies according to country-specific historical and cultural backgrounds, as 
well as the resulting ESG conditions. For example, previous research indicates that: (1) environmental 
aspects are the main sustainability issues for Spanish companies due to the impact of environmental 
disasters on Spanish society over the last several decades [25]; (2) environmental issues are less 
managed in French companies, in line with stakeholders’ demands, mainly because stakeholders would 
like stricter management of social issues showing high values for the issues of training and 
development, diversity and equal opportunity, and consumer protection [26]; and (3) Japanese 
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companies manage biodiversity closely, a topic that receives considerably less international attention 
on average [27]. Based on these premises, the following hypothesis will be tested: 
H1: Corporate commitment to the UNGC has a positive influence on firms’ ESG performance. 
The non-rejection of this hypothesis may be motivated by the fact that companies that adopt the 
UNGC often experience a positive organizational change resulting from stakeholders’ engagement, 
which fosters the UDHR, sustainable development, and the common good. 
2.2. Bidirectional Linkages between ESG and Financial Performances of Companies Committed to  
the UNGC 
The instrumental approach of CSR [28,29] has widely investigated the link between firms’ ESG and 
financial performances [30,31]. Given the inherent instrumentality of sustainable development [32],  
it is often argued that companies will only contribute to sustainable development if they perceive an 
incentive to do so [33]. An environmentally friendly company that is not economically friendly will 
sooner or later disappear from the market, along with its environmentally beneficial activities [34]. 
This consideration is similar to the business-case model of CSR defined by Berger et al. [35], which 
considers CSR initiatives as adopted for purely rational and economic reasons for years; thus, the link 
between a good social/environmental performer and a good financial performer has been a core topic 
in corporate social/environmental management. 
Instrumental Stakeholder Theory [36,37] suggests a positive relationship between companies’ ESG 
and financial performances [31,38–43]. However, the literature has also established the importance of 
the direction [15,29,33,44]. That is, do improvements in companies’ ESG performance generate 
improved levels of CFP? Or do improvements in CFP generate improved levels of firms’ ESG 
performance? Thus, two views can be justified theoretically and tested empirically: slack resources and 
good management theories [15]. 
Slack resources theory argues that better CFP potentially results in the availability of slack financial 
and other resources that provide the opportunity to invest in ESG activities [15]; thus, better CFP 
would be a predictor of better corporations’ ESG performance [45]. This is in line with the view that 
financially successful companies have more financial resources that they can spend on ESG issues and 
therefore attain a higher performance [15,30,31,33,44,46]. This view is often based on the belief that 
good ESG performance is a type of luxury good for a company after it has reached high economic 
success [34]. The most successful companies have the most financial resources and can spend the most 
on CSR activities [15,44,46]. Seifert et al. [47] suggest that a company’s free cash flows—one of the 
most discretionary types of organizational slack—has a significant impact on its cash donations to 
charitable causes. However, if companies have fewer financial resources and consider ESG issues 
unnecessary, they would of course reduce the funding for CSR activities, and therefore their ESG 
performance could deteriorate [33]. Based on these premises, the following hypothesis is proposed:  
H2: Corporate financial performance has a positive impact on ESG performance for companies 
committed to the UNGC. 
Good management theorists argue that there is a positive correlation between the implementation of 
good management practices and CFP [15] because attention to CSR improves the stakeholders’ 
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engagement [48], resulting in financial success [45]. Companies’ ESG performance as a distinctive 
resource may generate benefits or reduce costs, both of which improve CFP [30]—for example, 
reducing costs by mitigating the likelihood of negative regulatory, or legislative, actions [39,48] or 
reducing cost in the production process. Christmann [49], who assessed survey data from 88 chemical 
companies, found that capabilities for process innovation and implementation are complementary 
assets that moderate the relationship between environmentally friendly best practices and cost 
advantage, which are significant factors in determining CFP. Ruf et al. [50] revealed that changes in 
firms’ ESG performance were positively associated with growth in companies’ sales for the current 
and subsequent years. In accordance with these arguments, good management theory suggests that the 
appearance of doing well (or the perception among key stakeholders that a company is doing well) 
generates demand for and commitment to the company’s stock, jobs, or products [30]. This can be 
explained by the fact that the cost of having a high level of ESG performance is minimal and that firms 
may actually benefit from socially responsible actions in terms of employee morale and productivity [51]. 
In this vein, Choi and Yu [52] concluded that perceptions of CSR practices have a positive impact on 
their organizational commitment and organizational citizenship behavior, and this behavior partially 
mediates the relationship between CSR practices and CFP. Firms can be more successful by 
developing (up to some margin) relationships with customers, employees, communities, and 
governments [53,54], differentiating the firm’s products/services and thereby attracting socially 
responsive investors [55]. Ribstein [56] considered that CSR could determine higher financial results 
based on the improvement of strategy processes and also on employee, customer, and society loyalty. 
Peloza [57] shows that positive CSR acts as insurance by protecting reputation and reducing  
the financial impact of negative publicity. Pan et al. [58] found that shareholder responsibility;  
employee responsibility; environmental responsibility; and supplier, customer, and consumer 
responsibility have significant relationships with CFP. Moreover, the perception of being an “ethical” 
company could improve the company’s reputation [59], which is a key factor for its success or for 
attracting financial resources from socially responsible investors. Based on these premises, the 
following hypothesis is proposed: 
H3: Companies’ ESG performance has a positive impact on financial success for  
UNGC-committed firms. 
2.3. The Role of Country as a Moderator Variable 
Previous research has demonstrated that managers behave differently across countries because they 
are highly influenced by the national cultural values [60–63], organizational culture [64,65], or 
businesses in which they are embedded [66]. In that context, several studies have been developed with 
the aim of showing those differences in firms’ CSR priorities depending on the home country of the 
companies. Specifically, Welford [67] studied companies from the U.K., Norway, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore, concluding that companies respond to what is important in their own country. Maignan and 
Ralston [68] found that continental European companies show lower levels of emphasis on codes of 
ethics and philanthropic CSR than those in the U.S., while the U.S. companies do not show higher 
levels of environmental performance. Baughn et al. [69] compared two themes of CSR—environmental 
and social issues—in 14 Asian countries with companies from Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand, 
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U.S., Canada, the Middle East, and Africa. They reveal strong relationships between CSR and ESG 
practices and the country’s economic, political, and social contexts, which reflect the importance of a 
country’s development of such institutional capacity to promote and support CSR practices. Aaronson 
et al. [70] analyzed the differences between U.K. and U.S. firms. They conclude that firms in U.K and 
the U.S.—two nations with similar political and entrepreneurial cultures—have taken such different 
approaches to CSR policies. Thus, it is reasonable to think that firms’ CSR and ESG activities may be 
valued differently by shareholders on the one hand and, on the other hand, by other stakeholders in 
different countries with different cultural and institutional backgrounds [71]. Given this factor, the 
present work considers companies operating in three countries with different institutional 
characteristics [72] and legal and judicial traditions [71]. The following hypothesis is proposed and 
will be tested: 
H4: The links between ESG performance and financial performance of firms is moderated by their 
geographical spread. 
The non-rejection of this hypothesis will inform us that the financial benefits derived from 
improvements in firms’ ESG performance may differ from country to country. In fact, CFP may affect 
ESG efforts differently from country to country, as financial objectives and respective CSR objectives 
(social, environmental, and corporate governance) may differ according to the country. 
3. Sample, Data, and Method 
This research focuses on companies operating in the three countries that the highest rate of firms 
committed to the UNGC: Spain, France, and Japan. The data used in this work is twofold: (1) data 
related to firms’ ESG performance, and (2) data related to the market and accounting proxies of CFP. 
Companies’ ESG performance was measured by examining the corporate environmental (CEP), social 
(CSP), and governance performance (CGP) composite ESG indexes provided by the ASSET4® 
database of DataStream provided by Thomson Reuters Inc., which provides objective and systematic 
ESG data using more than 280 key performance indicators and 750 individual data points and their 
original data sources from over 4000 global companies, including MSCI World, MSCI Europe, 
STOXX 600, NASDAQ 100, ASX 300, and MSCI Emerging Markets. The companies’ ESG 
performance measures comprise variables that capture a wide range of stakeholder performance issues, 
assessed by independent external social audits [31] that apply social and environmental screens, thus 
reflecting companies’ social, environmental, and corporate governance strengths and weaknesses. This 
dataset, such as that provided by the Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) dataset, is recognized as 
the most complete rating of ESG performance and social responsibility. The database search provided 
a total of 198 companies operating in Spain, France, and Japan that are committed to the UNGC.  
These companies were monitored from 2008–2013, grouped in 10 primary economic sectors in the 
Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) system. Firms’ CSP, CEP, and CGP measures are 
defined as follows: 
• CSP: measures a company’s capacity to generate trust and loyalty in its workforce, customers, 
and society, through its use of best management practices. It is a reflection of the company’s 
reputation, which is a key factor in determining its ability to generate long-term value. This 
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composite index results from a weighted score of the company’s strengths and weakness on 
indicators related to: (a) product responsibility, (b) community, (c) human rights, (d) diversity 
and opportunity, (e) employment quality, (f) health and safety and (g) training and development.  
• CEP: measures a company’s impact on living and non-living natural systems, including the air, 
land, and water, as well as complete ecosystems. It reflects the extent to which a company uses 
best management practices to avoid environmental risks and capitalize on environmental 
opportunities. This composite index results from a weighted score of the company’s strengths  
and weaknesses on indicators related to: (a) emission reduction, (b) product innovation, and  
(c) resource consumption reduction. 
• CGP: measures a company’s systems and processes, which ensure that its board members and 
executives act in the best interests of its long-term shareholders. It reflects a company’s capacity, 
through its use of best management practices, to direct and control its rights and responsibilities 
through the creation of incentives. This composite index results from a weighted score of the 
company’s strengths and weaknesses on indicators related to: (a) board functions, (b) board 
structure, (c) compensation policy, (d) vision and strategy, and (e) shareholder rights. 
These composite indexes take values from 0–100. The higher the company’s score on each 
composite index, the higher their level of CSP, CEP, or CGP. 
CFP has been measured through both accounting and market based proxies drawn from the 
DataStream database: (1) companies’ Tobin’s q (TQ) and (2) companies’ return on assets (ROA). 
Whereas ROA is defined as a company’s profits before taxes divided by the average of its total assets, 
the TQ is the ratio of the firm market value to the replacement cost of its assets. TQ has been measured 
in this paper following the simple approximation of Lindenberg and Ross [73], as provided by Lee and 
Tompkins [74]. Market-based and accounting-based methods for measuring CFP each have their 
advantages and limitations. On the one hand, accounting-based measures focus on firms’ historical 
assessment of accounting profitability, capturing indicators such as ROA, assets growth, operating 
revenue, etc., which can be biased due to the differences in accounting procedures and managerial 
manipulation. On the other hand, market-based measures are less susceptible to accounting rules and 
managerial manipulation, but are only related to the shareholders instead of focusing on firms’ 
stakeholders. However, the consideration of both types of CFP measures may provide a more 
comprehensible picture of the hypothesized relationships. 
Finally, we included several control variables: (1) firms’ size (SIZE), measured by the natural 
logarithm of the companies’ total assets. This transformation is made because the distribution of firms’ 
total assets is commonly non-normally distributed. This control variable should be especially relevant 
because of the possible appearance of scale economies related to environmentally and socially oriented 
investments and initiatives; (2) companies’ leverage (LEV), a proxy of firms’ risk defined as the ratio 
of the total debt to total assets; (3) the economic sector in which the different companies operate (i.e., 
basic materials, consumer cyclicals, consumer non-cyclicals, energy, financials, healthcare, industrials, 
technology, telecommunication services, and utilities); and (4) research and development (R&D) 
intensity measured by the ratio of the R&D expenditure to total sales. This control variable has been 
considered since omitting it from models of the relationship between CSP, CEP, and CFP will likely 
lead to misleading results [75]. This is because the process of product differentiation may include 
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investment in R&D projects intended to add social and environmental attributes to the product that are 
acknowledged by customers [76]. Finally, we control for time-specific factors. 
To test for the hypothesized relationships, several time-random effects panel data models have been 
estimated considering the degree of CEP, CSP, and CFP as dependent variables. The baseline models 
for the H1 hypothesis are given by: 
12
i,t 0 1 i,t 2 i,t 3 i,t i i,t i,t i,t
i=4
CSP =β +β SIZE +β LEV +β R&D + β SECTOR +μ +ε
 
(1) 
12
i,t 0 1 i,t 2 i,t 3 i,t i i,t i,t i,t
i=4
CEP =β +β SIZE +β LEV +β R&D + β SECTOR +μ +ε
 
(2) 
12
i,t 0 1 i,t 2 i,t 3 i,t i i,t i,t i,t
i=4
CGP =β +β SIZE +β LEV +β R&D + β SECTOR +μ +ε
 
(3) 
where CSP, CEP, CGP, SIZE, LEV, and R&D intensity have been previously defined; and SECTOR is 
different dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the company “i” operates in sector “j” (basic 
materials is the baseline case for sector dummies). In order to test whether the commitment to the 
UNGC influences the companies’ degree of ESG performance, the initial dataset has been broadened 
to include other companies that do not adhere to the UNGC. With the aim of obtaining a homogeneous 
augmented sample, the additional companies have been selected through a matching approach that 
considers the following parameters of firms: country, economic sector, firm size, firm total assets, and 
sales and leverage. The augmented sample consists of 396 companies (i.e., 198 firms committed to the 
UNGC and 198 that are not committed to that initiative). On the augmented sample, the following 
restricted panels have been estimated: 
13
i,t 0 1 i,t 2 i,t 3 i,t 4 i,t i i,t i,t i,t
i=5
CSP =β +β SIZE +β LEV +β R&D +β UNGC + β SECTOR +μ +ε
 
(4) 
13
i,t 0 1 i,t 2 i,t 3 i,t 4 i,t i i,t i,t i,t
i=5
CSP =β +β SIZE +β LEV +β R&D +β UNGC + β SECTOR +μ +ε
 (5) 
13
i,t 0 1 i,t 2 i,t 3 i,t 4 i,t i i,t i,t i,t
i=5
CGP =β +β SIZE +β LEV +β R&D +β UNGC + β SECTOR +μ +ε
 (6) 
where UNGC is a dummy variable that takes a value equal to 1 if the company “i” is committed to the 
UNGC and zero otherwise; the rest of the variables are previously defined. These models have been 
estimated with consideration given to the independents in levels and lagged one period to test for 
robustness in the estimates. The acceptance/rejection of the H1 hypothesis will be discussed by 
examining the significance of the parameters associated with the UNGC parameters. 
Related to the H2 hypothesis, which aimed to test whether, in the firms committed to the UNGC, a 
relationship existed between the firms’ level of CFP and their ESG success, the following set of panels 
have been estimated: 
5 14
i,t 0 1 i,t-1 2 i,t-1 i i,t-1 i i,t i,t i,t
i=3 i=6
CSP =β +β ROA +β TQ + β FCs β SECTOR +μ +ε   (7) 
5 14
i,t 0 1 i,t-1 2 i,t-1 i i,t-1 i i,t i,t i,t
i=3 i=6
CEP =β +β ROA +β TQ + β FCs β SECTOR +μ +ε   (8) 
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5 14
i,t 0 1 i,t-1 2 i,t-1 i i,t-1 i i,t i,t i,t
i=3 i=6
CGP =β +β ROA +β TQ + β FCs β SECTOR +μ +ε   (9) 
where CSP, CEP, and CGP are the degree of social, environmental, and governance performance of 
the company “i”; FCs refer to the financial control variables previously introduced (i.e., size, leverage, 
and R&D intensity); the rest of the parameters were previously defined. Due to the scarce differences 
observed when estimating the previous models in terms of levels and considering the first lag of the 
independent variables, we selected the latter approach because it is more consistent with the idea that 
the effects of companies’ financial performance on their ESG performance are likely to be observed in 
subsequent periods. The acceptance/rejection of the H2 hypothesis will be discussed by examining the 
significance of the parameters associated with ROA and TQ variables. 
Regarding the H3 hypothesis, which aimed to examine whether, in the firms committed to the 
UNGC, a relationship existed between the firms’ ESG performance and their CFP, the following set of 
panels have been estimated: 
6 15
i,t 0 1 i,t-1 2 i,t-1 3 i,t-1 i i,t-1 i i,t i,t i,t
i=4 i=7
TQ =β +β CSP +β CEP +β CGP β FCs + β SECTOR +μ +ε    (10) 
6 15
i,t 0 1 i,t-1 2 i,t-1 3 i,t-1 i i,t-1 i i,t i,t i,t
i=4 i=7
ROA =β +β CSP +β CEP +β CGP β FCs β SECTOR +μ +ε    (11) 
where all of the variables have been previously defined. The acceptance/rejection of the H3 hypothesis 
will be discussed by examining the significance of the parameters associated with CSP, CEP and  
CGP variables. 
Regarding the H4 hypothesis, as indicated in Figure 1, it was tested whether the country in which 
the companies operate moderates the relationship between the firms’ ESG performance and CFP.  
To do this, panels (7) to (11) have been re-estimated but include all the cross products of the CSP, 
CEP, CGP, country spread, and both the CFP and country spread as independent variables in  
each model where a significant effect was found in the initial models (Spain is the baseline case for 
country dummies).  
 
Figure 1. The moderating effect of country on the relationship between Corporate Social 
(CSP), Environmental (CEP), Governance (CGP), and Financial Performance (CFP).  
The acceptance/rejection of the H4 hypothesis will be discussed by examining the significance of 
the parameters associated with the cross products of the CSP, CEP, CGP, country and CFP, and the  
country variables. 
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4. Results and Discussion 
This section reviews the main results provided in the empirical analysis. Table 1 shows the basic 
descriptive statistics of the variables included in the models and their cross-correlations. A first look at 
the table reveals that the environmental dimension (i.e., CEP), followed by the social dimension  
(i.e., CSP), has the highest ESG mean score of the companies examined. On the contrary, the 
companies’ level of CGP seems to be relatively lower than the other two dimensions. Furthermore, the 
three measures of companies’ ESG performance (i.e., CEP, CSP, and CGP) seem to be highly and 
positively correlated. CEP is positively correlated with the two measures of CFP (i.e., ROA and TQ). 
However, the rest of the firms’ ESG performance measures present scarce correlation with companies’ 
ROA and TQ. As expected, TQ and ROA are positively correlated, an aspect that confirms the idea 
that a profitable company is usually better valuated by the investors in the stock market. The  
financial control variables (i.e., size, leverage, and R&D intensity) appear to be correlated in different 
ways with companies’ CFP and CSP, and their CEP and CGP (e.g., companies’ size is positively 
correlated with CEP and negatively associated with TQ). Finally, the mean score of the companies in 
the UNGC variable is 0.5. This is because the augmented sample considers the 198 companies 
committed to the UNGC and 198 firms that do not comply with the voluntary CSR initiative. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and variable pairwise correlations. 
 Mean SD CEP CSP CGP TQ ROA Size Leverage 
R&D 
intensity 
UNGC 
CEP 66.25 31.26 1         
CSP 56.64 33.57 0.773 1        
CGP 23.42 24.91 0.400 0.555 1       
TQ 1.224 0.658 0.097 0.007 0.077 1      
ROA 2.984 5.393 0.098 0.034 0.042 0.411 1     
Size 19.61 2.309 0.086 −0.017 −0.433 −0.311 −0.132 1    
Leverage 1.255 1.102 0.016 0.022 0.014 −0.006 −0.043 −0.032 1   
R&D intensity 3.535 3.535 0.156 0.188 0.113 0.233 −0.055 −0.134 −0.019 1  
UNGC 0.500 0.478 0.323 0.451 0.419 −0.002 −0.004 −0.124 0.033 0.049 1 
This table shows the main descriptive statistics of the considered variables and their pairwise correlations. N = 396. All correlations above |.07| are significant at the  
p = 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
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Figure 2 shows several boxplots that refer to the companies’ score on the ESG performance 
measures classified by country and by the companies’ commitment to the UNGC. Some interesting 
features of this figure warrant comment. First, the companies’ levels of ESG performance appear to be 
higher in those companies committed to the UNGC. Second, these differences are more remarkable 
when examining the firms’ CEP and CSP than when analyzing their CGP levels. This could be 
preliminary evidence of higher performance on environmental, social, and corporate governance 
dimensions for those companies that consider the principles of the UNGC. However, this issue will be 
analyzed in detail when examining the results obtained after estimating Equations (1) to (6). Third, the 
companies’ ESG performance seems to be influenced by their geographical spread. This is because, 
although companies’ CEP seems to be homogeneous for the companies committed to the UNGC, the 
firms’ CSP and CGP are higher in Spanish and French than in Japanese companies. 
 
Figure 2. CSP, CEP, and CGP by commitment to UNGC and country. 
Table 2 shows the estimates of the Equations (1) to (6), which aim to test whether the commitment 
to the principles of the UNGC influences the companies’ ESG performance. It is worth mentioning 
that a low variability in the estimates is appreciated after running the models considering the 
independents in levels and in their first lag. This effect provides greater evidence of the robustness of 
the relations identified by the models. As shown in this table, the financial control variables (i.e., size, 
leverage, R&D intensity) are associated in different ways with the studied measures of firms’ ESG 
performance.  
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Table 2. Influence of the commitment to the UNGC on firms’ CSP, CEP, and CGP. 
 CSP CEP CGP 
Constant 
62.78 *** 
(14.007) 
32.45 *** 
(12.629) 
58.93 *** 
(14.861) 
33.65 *** 
(13.447) 
52.06 *** 
(12.203) 
29.65 *** 
(11.582) 
51.69 *** 
(12.572) 
34.59 *** 
(11.976) 
61.98 *** 
(12.042) 
42.23 *** 
(10.23) 
59.02 *** 
(12.45) 
45.04 *** 
(10.34) 
UNGC  
34.35 *** 
(2.796) 
 
31.57 *** 
(2.931) 
 
23.96 *** 
(2.573) 
 
20.25 *** 
(2.614) 
 
19.52 *** 
(1.813) 
 
17.41 *** 
(1.979) 
Financial controls            
Size 
−0.433 
(0.677) 
0.675 
(0.606) 
  
0.889 
(0.590) 
1.724 
(0.555) 
  
−4.700 *** 
(0.431) 
−4.118 *** 
(0.394) 
  
Leverage 
5.7 × 10−6 
(0.0005) 
1.1 × 10−6 
(0.0005) 
  
7.5 × 10−6 
(0.0005) 
3.9 × 10−6 
(0.0005) 
  
9.3 × 10−6 
(0.0003) 
3.5 × 10−6 
(0.0003) 
  
R&D intensity 
0.672 *** 
(0.161) 
0.691 *** 
(0.157) 
  
0.410 
(0.142) 
0.437 *** 
(0.139) 
  
−0.033 
(0.108) 
−0.026 
(0.106) 
  
L1 size   
−0.088 
(0.720) 
0.815 
(0.647) 
  
1.059 * 
(0.609) 
1.682 *** 
(0.576) 
  
−4.460 *** 
(0.469) 
−3.999 *** 
(0.437) 
L1 leverage   
−0.0006 
(0.0008) 
−0.0007 
(0.0008) 
  
−0.0003 
(0.0007) 
−0.0004 
(0.0007) 
  
0.0001 
(0.0006) 
0.0001 
(0.0006) 
L1 R&D intensity   
0.577 *** 
(0.182) 
0.601 *** 
(0.177) 
  
0.363 ** 
(0.158) 
0.393 ** 
(0.156) 
  
0.056 
(0.122) 
0.065 
(0.119) 
Non-financial controls            
Consumer cyclicals 
−3.892 
(5.308) 
−4.657 
(4.602) 
1.331 
(5.384) 
−0.183 
(4.727) 
−6.562 
(4.618) 
−7.067 
(4.239) 
−0.388 
(4.536) 
−1.345 
(4.215) 
2.474 
(3.349) 
1.979 
(2.982) 
3.525 
(3.492) 
2.688 
(3.192) 
Consumer  
non-cyclicals 
−9.672 
(6.685) 
−14.11 ** 
(5.809) 
−6.992 
(6.848) 
−12.52 ** 
(6.032) 
−16.35 *** 
(5.816) 
−19.43 *** 
(5.35) 
−14.29 ** 
(5.769) 
−17.82 *** 
(5.379) 
3.978 
(4.219) 
1.422 
(3.765) 
5.435 
(4.442) 
2.364 
(4.073) 
Energy 
12.120 
(8.903) 
4.111 
(7.751) 
10.253 
(9.112) 
4.177 
(8.028) 
4.682 
(7.746) 
−0.858 
(7.138) 
1.741 
(7.679) 
−2.132 
(7.157) 
17.13 *** 
(5.620) 
12.54 ** 
(5.024) 
15.82 *** 
(5.913) 
12.47 ** 
(5.421) 
Financials 
−26.24 ** 
(12.786) 
−21.47 * 
(11.164) 
−1.847 
(21.614) 
−9.024 
(18.965) 
−33.14 *** 
(11.129) 
−29.79 *** 
(10.261) 
−25.46 
(18.205) 
−29.97 * 
(16.913) 
3.671 
(8.095) 
6.245 
(7.253) 
15.48 
(14.02) 
11.47 
(12.80) 
Healthcare 
−1.990 
(7.777) 
−3.659 
(6.787) 
0.388 
(7.647) 
−1.682 
(6.767) 
−11.36 * 
(6.769) 
−12.63 ** 
(6.239) 
−10.17 
(6.459) 
−11.63 * 
(6.029) 
1.225 
(4.925) 
0.279 
(4.409) 
1.065 
(4.973) 
−0.064 
(4.570) 
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Table 2. Cont. 
 CSP CEP CGP 
Industrials 
0.110 
(5.108) 
−4.142 
(4.442) 
3.797 
(5.131) 
−0.901 
(4.524) 
0.529 
(4.444) 
−2.410 
(4.091) 
4.297 
(4.323) 
1.311 
(4.034) 
4.382 
(3.223) 
1.922 
(2.877) 
4.285 
(3.328) 
1.712 
(3.055) 
Technology 
−3.046 
(6.200) 
−6.989 
(5.387) 
0.641 
(6.154) 
−4.204 
(5.426) 
−6.312 
(5.394) 
−9.099 * 
(4.9615) 
−3.563 
(5.187) 
−6.718 
(4.837) 
4.004 
(3.914) 
1.741 
(3.492) 
4.779 
(3.993) 
2.115 
(3.664) 
Telecomm. Services 
8.204 
(11.798) 
3.616 
(10.237) 
5.220 
(12.092) 
3.169 
(10.608) 
−6.065 
(10.265) 
−9.285 
(9.429) 
−9.830 
(10.185) 
−11.15 
(9.460) 
14.83 ** 
(7.446) 
12.19 * 
(6.633) 
9.368 
(7.842) 
8.254 
(7.163) 
Utilities 
4.873 
(8.359) 
1.863 
(7.257) 
−2.682 
(8.664) 
−4.280 
(7.606) 
3.313 
(7.273) 
1.244 
(6.683) 
−0.269 
(7.299) 
−1.312 
(6.783) 
11.24 ** 
(5.277) 
9.572 ** 
(4.704) 
6.921 
(5.620) 
6.094 
(5.136) 
Time effects             
2009 
2.822 *** 
(0.757) 
2.890 *** 
(0.755) 
  
2.196 *** 
(0.666) 
2.244 *** 
(0.666) 
  
1.799 *** 
(0.515) 
1.835 *** 
(0.514) 
  
2010 
3.131 *** 
(0.753) 
3.169 *** 
(0.751) 
−0.105 
(0.711) 
0.030 
(0.709) 
3.188 *** 
(0.663) 
3.218 *** 
(0.662) 
0.771 
(0.623) 
0.797 
(0.623) 
5.132 *** 
(0.512) 
5.154 *** 
(0.512) 
2.861 *** 
(0.481) 
2.882 *** 
(0.480) 
2011 
5.332 *** 
(0.756) 
5.343 *** 
(0.755) 
2.259 *** 
(0.710) 
2.279 *** 
(0.709) 
4.489 *** 
(0.665) 
4.503 *** 
(0.665) 
2.133 *** 
(0.623) 
2.150 *** 
(0.623) 
4.913 *** 
(0.515) 
4.920 *** 
(0.514) 
2.691 *** 
(0.480) 
2.701 *** 
(0.480) 
2012 
3.847 *** 
(0.753) 
3.787 *** 
(0.752) 
0.825 
(0.712) 
0.828 
(0.711) 
3.850 *** 
(0.663) 
3.802 *** 
(0.663) 
1.552 ** 
(0.624) 
1.558 ** 
(0.624) 
1.293 ** 
(0.513) 
1.250 ** 
(0.512) 
−1.039 ** 
(0.481) 
−1.038 ** 
(0.481) 
2013 
4.996 *** 
(0.766) 
4.861 *** 
(0.764) 
2.122 *** 
(0.726) 
2.146 *** 
(0.724) 
4.329 *** 
(0.674) 
4.217 *** 
(0.674) 
2.285 *** 
(0.637) 
2.232 *** 
(0.637) 
1.218 ** 
(0.521) 
1.185 ** 
(0.520) 
−1.412 *** 
(0.491) 
−1.454 *** 
(0.490) 
This table shows the estimates of the unbalanced panel data represented by Equations (1) to (6), which aim to test whether the firms’ commitment to the UNGC has an 
influence on their environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance levels. N = 396. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors to heteroscedasticity.  
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. 
Sustainability 2015, 7 1947 
 
Specifically, the higher the companies’ R&D intensity ratio, the higher their levels of CSP and CEP. 
Conversely, this ratio seems not to have a significant impact on CGP levels. Furthermore, the greater 
the companies’ size, the higher their CEP levels and the lower their CGP. The estimates also show that 
companies’ leverage ratio does not have a significant impact on their ESG performance. The economic 
sector in which the companies operate seems to not play a fundamental role in explaining companies’ 
ESG performance. However, the following trends have been identified: (a) companies operating in 
financials and in consumer non-cyclicals obtained lower levels of CSP and CEP than the baseline 
industry (i.e., basic materials), and (b) companies involved in energy, telecommunication services, and 
utilities significantly outperform the basic materials firms in terms of CGP. The time effects are mostly 
significant, thus indicating that the firms’ CSP, CEP, and CGP are influenced by the different time 
periods considered in the panels. The positive/negative sign of the time effects coefficients should be 
interpreted since the companies obtained higher/lower levels of ESG performance when compared 
with the baseline period (i.e., 2008). 
More interestingly, the coefficients related to the UNGC variable are positive and significant. It is 
worth mentioning that these coefficients are significant at 1% and when considering both the in-levels 
and lagged exogenous variables. This clearly indicates that the firms’ commitment to the principles 
established by the UNGC positively influences the companies’ levels of ESG performance. Thus, H1 
cannot be rejected. It is interesting to note that the magnitude of the UNGC coefficients vary across the 
different measures of companies’ ESG performance. In fact, the greater impact of the commitment to 
the UNGC is observed on the firms’ social dimension. This result can be explained by the fact that the 
UNGC mostly focuses on social issues: six of its 10 principles are related to social issues. Moreover, 
the lower influence of firms’ commitment to the UNGC causes the companies’ CGP to increase. 
Table 3 shows the estimates of the Equations (7) to (11), which aimed to test the possible 
bidirectional relationships between the two measures of CFP (i.e., TQ and ROA) and the firm’s level 
of ESG performance. Some interesting insights that can be derived from this table warrant comment. 
As shown in the previous models, the financial controls are associated in different ways with the 
proposed measures of the firms’ ESG performance. It is interesting to note that these associations seem 
to be quite stable after the companies’ ROA and TQ are included as predictors, which confirms the 
robustness of the models. Moreover, the sector effects are similar to those identified when testing the 
H1 hypothesis. Again, some of the time effects are significant, indicating that the companies’ ESG 
performance is influenced by the time period examined. There are also interactions between the 
financial control variables and the two proposed measures of CFP. In fact, the greater the companies’ 
size, the lower their TQ and ROA. Furthermore, the leverage and R&D intensity ratios seem to have a 
negative impact on companies’ ROA. More interesting for the purposes of this research, Table 3 shows 
that companies’ CEP and CSP levels have a positive influence on companies’ TQ and ROA. The 
higher impact of these measures on companies’ CFP is appreciated in the CEP dimension. However, a 
bidirectional link is only found between firms’ CSP and TQ, which is due to the fact that the 
companies’ TQ does not significantly explain the companies’ level of CEP. Firms’ CEP and CGP 
levels have a positive and significant effect on firms’ ROA. Interestingly, the impact of CEP on 
companies’ ROA is higher than the effect associated with the firms’ CGP levels. However, a 
bidirectional link is only found between firms’ CEP and ROA, which is due to the fact that companies’ 
ROA does not significantly explain the companies’ level of CGP. The estimates also show that the 
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higher the companies’ ROA ratio, the higher their CSP levels. These considerations support the H2 and 
H3 hypotheses. 
Table 3. Bidirectional linkages between firms’ financial performance and their CSP, CEP, 
and CGP. 
 TQ ROA CSP CEP CGP 
Constant 
2.154 *** 
(0.229) 
14.10 *** 
(3.142) 
65.04 *** 
(13.534) 
58.23 *** 
(12.234) 
65.34 *** 
(13.936) 
L1 CEP 
0.0423 *** 
(0.0061) 
0.034 *** 
(0.002) 
   
L1 CSP 
0.0157 ** 
(0.0064) 
−0.004 
(0.014) 
   
L1 CGP 
0.0009 
(0.0007) 
0.013 *** 
(0.004) 
   
L1 TQ   
2.822 ** 
(1.189) 
−0.498 
(1.568) 
0.160 
(0.612) 
L1 ROA   
0.159 * 
(0.085) 
0.163 ** 
(0.084) 
0.058 
(0.041) 
Financial controls     
L1 size 
−0.429 *** 
(0.010) 
−0.279 * 
(0.144) 
2.322 ** 
(1.024) 
2.250 ** 
(0.873) 
−3.154 *** 
(0.478) 
L1 leverage 
2 × 10−6 
(9 × 10−7) 
−0.0001 *** 
(0.00001) 
−0.0004 
(0.0009) 
−0.0004 
(0.0007) 
−0.0006 
(0.0004) 
L1 R&D intensity 
−0.005 
(0.004) 
−0.198 *** 
(0.070) 
0.698 *** 
(0.220) 
0.615 *** 
(0.192) 
0.014 
(0.112) 
Non-financial controls     
Consumer cyclicals 
−0.065 
(0.093) 
−1.305 
(1.200) 
0.318 
(6.077) 
−0.231 
(5.487) 
−1.103 
(2.937) 
Consumer non-cyclicals 
0.289 *** 
(0.106) 
1.089 
(1.361) 
−25.11 *** 
(8.310) 
−28.18 *** 
(7.504) 
−6.884 * 
(3.893) 
Energy 
−0.063 
(0.125) 
0.078 
(1.616) 
6.915 
(11.44) 
1.225 
(10.34) 
11.595 ** 
(5.736) 
Financials 
−0.215 
(0.283) 
−4.446 
(3.576) 
−33.38 
(29.46) 
−34.93 
(26.60) 
0.541 
(6.735) 
Healthcare 
0.654 *** 
(0.132) 
4.793 *** 
(1.740) 
−2.330 
(8.921) 
−14.31 * 
(8.066) 
−1.893 
(4.497) 
Industrials 
−0.051 
(0.086) 
−0.932 
(1.098) 
−3.616 
(5.927) 
2.876 
(5.352) 
−0.521 
(2.899) 
Technology 
0.046 
(0.101) 
−1.929 
(1.294) 
−4.332 
(7.264) 
−8.820 
(6.561) 
1.008 
(3.568) 
Telecomm. Services 
0.293 
(0.182) 
1.255 
(2.370) 
5.500 
(14.04) 
−11.01 
(12.68) 
6.638 
(7.060) 
Utilities 
−0.081 
(0.141) 
−0.617 
(1.857) 
−9.875 
(9.847) 
−4.282 
(8.893) 
3.248 
(4.786) 
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Table 3. Cont. 
 TQ ROA CSP CEP CGP 
Time effects      
2010 
−0.008 
(0.024) 
−1.407 *** 
(0.455) 
0.992 
(0.972) 
0.456 
(0.894) 
3.930 *** 
(1.150) 
2011 
−0.099 *** 
(0.024) 
−0.866 * 
(0.455) 
2.992 *** 
(0.940) 
3.129 *** 
(0.865) 
4.030 *** 
(1.063) 
2012 
−0.085 *** 
(0.023) 
−1.655 *** 
(0.448) 
0.622 
(0.946) 
1.542 * 
(0.870) 
−0.577 
(1.065) 
2013 
−0.007 
(0.024) 
−1.863 *** 
(0.447) 
2.265 ** 
(0.978) 
2.289 ** 
(0.900) 
−1.895 * 
(1.108) 
This table shows the estimates of the unbalanced panel data represented by Equations (7) to (11), which aim 
to test the links between firms’ environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance and the CFP of the 
companies committed to the UNGC. N = 198. Values in parentheses are robust standard errors to 
heteroscedasticity. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%. 
Table 4 shows the estimates that will allow us to identify whether companies’ geographical spread 
plays a role as a moderator in the relationship between firms’ ESG and financial performance. The 
financial controls, sector, and time effects are shown briefly for brevity purposes. As shown in the 
table, some interactions are found when introducing the country as a moderator variable. First, the 
country variable seems to play an important role in the impact that the firms’ CEP has on their TQ. 
This is because both the main effect and the interaction between CEP and country on TQ are positive 
and significant. Specifically, the magnitude of the coefficients clearly indicates that those companies 
operating in Japan have the higher impact of CEP on their TQ. Conversely, the magnitude of the 
relationship between companies’ CEP and ROA is lower for the Japanese companies. Another 
interesting finding is that the impact of firms’ CSP on their TQ is greater in Spanish than in French and 
Japanese companies. The influence of firms’ CGP on their ROA seems to be of a similar magnitude in 
both Spanish and French companies, whereas the impact is significantly higher for Japanese firms. 
Companies’ TQ influence on their CSP levels is significantly higher in the case of Japanese and 
French companies, but has the highest effect in companies operating in Japan. It is interesting to note 
that the impact of companies’ ROA on CSP does not differ across the three countries examined. 
Finally, the positive impact of firms’ ROA on their levels of CEP is higher in the case of the Japanese 
companies. These different associations can be explained by the following reasons: (1) a Christian 
versus a Confucian cultural background may lead to a different emphasis on social versus 
environmental priorities, and (2) differences in the cultural and institutional settings.  
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Table 4. The role of country as a moderator variable. 
 TQ ROA CSP CEP 
Constant 
2.345 *** 
(0.301) 
12.02 *** 
(2.734) 
63.82 *** 
(12.622) 
55.91 *** 
(12.066) 
L1 CEP 
0.0253 *** 
(0.0045) 
0.019 *** 
(0.002) 
  
L1 CEP * France 
0.0004 
(0.0623) 
0.0014 
(0.0402) 
  
L1 CEP * Japan 
0.1235 *** 
(0.0034) 
−0.026 *** 
(0.0001) 
  
L1 CSP 
0.0124 *** 
(0.0014) 
   
L1 CSP * France 
−0.018 *** 
(0.0001) 
   
L1 CSP * Japan 
−0.035 *** 
(0.0001) 
   
L1 CGP  
0.0125 *** 
(0.003) 
  
L1 CGP * France  
0.0023 
(0.0475) 
  
L1 CGP * Japan  
0.0157 *** 
(0.0003) 
  
L1 TQ    
1.429 *** 
(0.734) 
 
L1 TQ * France   
1.0184 *** 
(0.0023) 
 
L1 TQ * Japan   
1.7831 *** 
(0.871) 
 
L1 ROA   
0.1411 * 
(0.0751) 
0.2371 *** 
(0.024) 
L1 ROA * France   
0.0026 
(0.012) 
0.0001 
(0.0025) 
L1 ROA * Japan   
0.0021 
(0.294) 
0.0991 ** 
(0.0510) 
    
Financial controls effect YES *** YES *** YES *** YES *** 
Sector effect YES *** YES *** YES *** YES *** 
Time effect YES *** YES *** YES *** YES *** 
This table shows the estimates of the unbalanced panel data, which aims to test whether, for firms committed 
to the UNGC, the country in which the companies operate moderates the relationship between their 
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance and their CFP. N = 198. Values in parentheses are 
robust standard errors to heteroscedasticity. *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%.  
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5. Conclusions 
Corporate social responsibility initiatives are expected to systematically encourage cultural and 
managerial changes in companies committed to sustainable development, human rights, and social  
well-being. This paper investigates a specific CSR mechanism—the United Nations Global  
Compact—to shed some light on the impact of UNGC commitment on corporations’ environmental, 
social, and governance (ESG) performance. Additionally, this work analyzes the possible bidirectional 
relationship between firms’ ESG performance and their financial performance (CFP) through several 
panels of data covering companies operating in the three countries that have the highest rate of 
companies committed to the UNGC: Spain, France, and Japan. This analysis will show essential 
information to improve companies’ sustainable strategic management policies. Finally, we test for the 
possible appearance of a country moderation effect in the aforementioned relationships. 
As the empirical analysis shows, the commitment of the companies to the UNGC has a positive and 
significant impact on firms’ ESG performance. It is worth mentioning that this link is observed during 
the negative and highly controversial economic setting covered by the sample—from 2008–2013, in 
which the global economy entered a period of deep recession—thus indicating that the positive 
implications of firms’ commitment to the UNGC are present even in bear market periods. This finding 
is of special interest as it demonstrates that the adoption of this voluntary CSR initiative will 
systematically improve companies’ ESG performance and thus have a positive effect on environmental 
preservation, human well-being, social justice, and sustainable development. In fact, companies will 
have non-financial incentives to adopt the UNGC that will result in a more coherent and sustainable 
development of community and society. The positive effect on corporations’ ESG performance due to 
their adoption of the UNGC can be explained by the fact that the commitment necessarily involves an 
organizational change that allows stakeholder engagement, universal rights, sustainable development, 
and the common good to flourish. 
Another interesting finding of this paper is the fact that those companies’ committed to the UNGC 
saw a significant and positive relationship between their ESG performance and their CFP, as measured 
by the companies’ TQ and ROA. Thus, it appears reasonable to say that those companies that do not 
actually consider the UNGC should be encouraged to adopt this voluntary CSR initiative, which will 
allow them, at the same time, to improve their ESG performance and their financial success. Moreover, 
a bidirectional link has been found between the different measures of companies’ ESG performance 
and their CFP, thus demonstrating the existence of a virtuous circle that can stimulate either the firms’ 
financial or ESG success. These findings are consistent with the premises of both the good 
management and slack resources theories. These considerations are of essential importance because, in 
the absence of firms’ non-financial incentives to adopt the UNGC, financial incentives can encourage 
compact commitment that will ultimately result, as indicated in this paper, in setting up collaborative 
solutions to support broadly accepted societal and environmental objectives. 
The relationships identified between companies’ ESG performance and CFP are moderated in 
different ways by the geographical spread in which the companies operate. It is interesting to note that 
despite the appearance of the moderation effects, the final observed linkages between firms’ ESG 
performance and CFP remain positive. This finding clearly indicates that the geographical spread in 
which companies develop their businesses is not an obstacle to obtaining the financial advantages of  
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the firms’ adoption and commitment of the principles established by the UNGC. Interestingly, this 
research provides evidence of the appearance of some positive moderating effects in the mentioned 
relationships, thus showing differences in the positive influence of firms’ ESG performance on CFP 
depending on the country in which the companies develop their business activity. Those findings are 
very important when establishing sustainable corporate strategic management policies. This is because, 
although sustainable development is a global concern, firms’ managers should take into account 
differences in countries’ cultural, institutional, and social differences to properly achieve corporate 
financial and non-financial objectives.  
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